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Abstract: Does more media censorship imply more regime stability? We argue that censorship may cause mass disapproval
for censoring regimes. In particular, we expect that censorship backfires when citizens can falsify media content through
alternative sources of information. We empirically test our theoretical argument in an autocratic regime—the German
Democratic Republic (GDR). Results demonstrate how exposed state censorship on the country’s emigration crisis fueled
outrage in the weeks before the 1989 revolution. Combining original weekly approval surveys on GDR state television and
daily content data of West German news programs with a quasi-experimental research design, we show that recipients
disapproved of censorship if they were able to detect misinformation through conflicting reports on Western television. Our
findings have important implications for the study of censoring systems in contemporary autocracies, external democracy
promotion, and campaigns aimed at undermining trust in traditional journalism.
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The German censors
 idiots.
—Heinrich Heine, Reisebilder, Chapter XII
I n 2003, Barbra Streisand filed a lawsuit against ama-teur photographer Kenneth Adelman for violatingher privacy rights. To document accelerated ero-
sion, Adelman had uploaded aerial images of the entire
California coastline tohiswebsite,withoneof themshow-
ing the singer’s mansion in Malibu. Beyond the fact that
the courts dismissed Streisand’s claim for damages and
injunction, only six people had downloaded the image
before the lawsuit—“including twice by her own lawyers”
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(Cacciottolo 2012)—whereas the website attracted over
400,000 visitors in the followingmonth. Named after this
incident, the “Streisand effect” describes the unintended
consequences counter to the censor’s initial motivation
for withholding information (Martin 2007).
To cement their power, both historical and contem-
porary political regimes suppress information (Roberts
2018). Especially autocratic governments often system-
atically control the media and communication flows to
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prevent the diffusion of information that could damage
their reputationor sparkpublic resistance against the state
(Little 2016). Research generally agrees that censorship
and propaganda can be powerful tools to boost regime
legitimacy andmaintain political stability (e.g., Cho, Lee,
and Song 2017; Stockmann and Gallagher 2011).
In view of the asserted effectiveness of information
manipulation, it is puzzling that contemporary autoc-
racies do not fully exhaust their capacity to implement
all-encompassing censorship (Gunitsky 2015; King, Pan,
and Roberts 2013, 2017). Existing explanations focus on
a regime’s benefits from granting at least some freedomof
expression. For example, autocracies without revelatory
elections might shy away from total censorship to gain
information on people’s opinions and grievances (e.g.,
Dimitrov 2014). Governments might also use free speech
to monitor local officials, release political pressure, and
signal responsiveness (e.g., Huang, Boranbay-Akan, and
Huang2019;Lorentzen2014).1 Finally, regimesmaygrant
freedom of expression to reduce the threat from revolu-
tion by revealing disunity within opposition movements
(Chen and Xu 2017).
We suggest another reason why modern autocracies
use censorship in a restrained way: More censorship
does not imply more stability. Recent theoretical work
holds that while information manipulation may improve
citizens’ beliefs about the regime, it can also diminish
the perceived reliability of state media (Little 2017;
Shadmehr and Bernhardt 2015). In effect, leaders lose
the key tool to influence the population in their favor. We
argue that blatant state censorship is likely to backfire,
particularly when people can draw on trusted alternative
sources of information to identify discrepancies. Such
alternative sources can be traditional media and,
increasingly, web-based communication technologies.
Systematically conflicting narratives between state media
and other sources increase the likelihood that recipients
believe to be censored if they sufficiently trust the
alternative source. Those who suspect that the state
is withholding important information should become
more interested in the censored issue and increasingly
critical of the censor. Yet, individuals might react to
censorship differently, depending on their personal
regime ties. People with an ideological predisposition to
the government may be less willing to trust alternative
sources, whereas those without such ties should be more
upset.
1With respect to new media channels, maintaining limited free-
doms allows governments to surveil and suppress opposition
groups more discriminately (Gohdes forthcoming).
To empirically test our argument, we study the
German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1989. We show
how excessive media censorship on the GDR refugee
crisis fueled major dissatisfaction, which eventually con-
tributed to the breakdown of one of the most stable War-
saw Pact regimes. Our findings demonstrate that people
were able to identify their regime’s bleak strategy of cen-
sorship and defamation based on the extensive reports on
West German television (WGTV). Before themass public
uprising in late 1989, thousands of GDR citizens had
left the country and occupied West German embassies to
force their emigration to the West. State-controlled East
German media largely denied these developments, con-
strued a legend about a massive hoax by Western intelli-
gence services, and insulted refugees as infamous traitors.
Those who stayed and watched reports about refugees on
WGTV could unmask domestic news reports as clumsy
propaganda.
Usingover 17,000 individual-level approval ratings of
GDR state television programs and original content data
based on West German news transcripts, we quantita-
tively show that censoring practices by East German state
media resonated poorly with the audience—irrespective
of the respondents’ ideological ties to the regime. Like
other viewers, members of the ruling Socialist Unity
Party (SED) markedly rejected censored news content.
To gauge causal effects, we leverage temporal variation in
television news reporting and spatial variation of WGTV
coverage (Crabtree, Darmofal, and Kern 2015). In ad-
dition, we run a placebo analysis of approval ratings
for the national lottery broadcasting to rule out that
our findings simply reflect a general trend in popular
dissatisfaction.
This article contributes to our knowledge about
backfiring dynamics of censorship (Roberts 2018;
Shadmehr and Bernhardt 2015). Based on unique obser-
vational data onmedia approval in a highly authoritarian
environment, we provide the first systematic test of
how excessive information manipulation can damage
the reliability of state media, which deprives the regime
of its capacity to influence the population (Gehlbach
and Sonin 2014; Little 2017). We hereby contribute
to an emerging research strand on propaganda effects
(Adena et al. 2015; DellaVigna et al. 2014; Peisakhin
and Rozenas 2018; Yanagizawa-Drott 2014). Finally,
our findings augment research on the nexus between
media, framing, and social movements (e.g., Andrews
and Biggs 2006; Myers 2000; Soule and Roggeband
2019), as well as the literature on political backlash
in reaction to physical repression (e.g., Daxecker and
Hess 2013; Moore 1998; Sutton, Butcher, and Svensson
2014).
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Research on Political Backlash
Studies on political backlash largely focus on adverse con-
sequences from physical repression.2 Research shows that
violence against protesters often not only fails to end pub-
lic upheaval but even intensifies domestic resistance (e.g.,
Francisco 2004; Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998), while at
the same timemotivating international sanctions and de-
fections in the security apparatus (e.g., Albrecht and Ohl
2016; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Nepstad 2013; Pion-
Berlin, Esparza, and Grisham 2014; Sutton, Butcher, and
Svensson 2014). The likelihood of backfiring depends on
the severity of repressivemeasures (e.g., Albrecht andOhl
2016;Moore 1998; Rasler 1996), initial opposition tactics,
and political institutions (e.g., Carey 2006; Gupta, Singh,
and Sprague 1993; Nepstad 2011).
Research on backlash from physical repression views
the media as a tool for activists to communicate
state atrocities, which helps mobilize resistance (Sutton,
Butcher, and Svensson 2014). In contrast, states with con-
trol over the media can withhold information and con-
tain the risk of protest escalation (Francisco 2004). This
perspective corresponds with studies that consider me-
dia censorship as an effective strategy to generate po-
litical stability (Cho, Lee, and Song 2017; Stockmann
and Gallagher 2011). By manipulating publicly available
information, leaders can inflate people’s opinion about
the regime’s performance and foster conformist behavior
in support of the government (Hollyer, Rosendorff, and
Vreeland 2015; Little 2017).
However, censorship and misinformation can entail
an independent risk of backlash. Formal models of cen-
sorship (Shadmehr and Bernhardt 2015) and propaganda
(Gehlbach and Sonin 2014; Horz 2018; Little 2017) hold
that information manipulation carries a trade-off: Al-
though biased reports may lead people to see the regime’s
performance in a more favorable light, they can also un-
dermine the source’s reliability. In other words, “excessive
media bias works against the government’s propaganda
interest, as citizens who ignore the news cannot be influ-
enced by it” (Gehlbach and Sonin 2014, 163). Censorship
and misinformation may therefore backfire by depriv-
ing the regime of its key instrument for influencing the
masses. Building upon this trade-off, we explain when
and why recipients are likely to turn against their censor.
Most related empirical work examines how beliefs
about the government’s performance can bemanipulated
by propaganda (Adena et al. 2015; Enikolopov, Petrova,
and Zhuravskaya 2011; Peisakhin and Rozenas 2018). Yet,
2Backlash or backfiring refers to any action that “recoils against its
originator” (Martin 2007, 2).
little is known about adverse effects from censorship—
particularly regarding its impact on people’s trust in state
media. Participants in laboratory experiments have been
found to disapprove of any evident withholding of infor-
mation, while at the same time developing a heightened
interest in the censored topic (Hayes and Reineke 2007;
Worchel, Arnold, and Baker 1975). Recent studies on
Chinese online censoring offer initial evidence for behav-
ioral changes among affected internet users, showing that
censoring measures are associated with more comments
on dissident blogs and downloads of anonymity technol-
ogy (Hobbs and Roberts 2018; Roberts 2018). Moreover,
people who personally experience censorship on social
media use more critical phrases within the first 10 days
after having been censored (Roberts 2018, 127–46). We
examine the conditions under which people can identify
censorship that is not directed against individuals but so-
ciety as a whole. We thereby systematically analyze the
effect of censorship on the perceived reliability of author-
itarian regime media.
With respect to differences between individuals’ reac-
tions to censorship, laboratory experiments suggest that
people with an ideological connection to the censor are
less likely to become upset (Worchel and Arnold 1973;
Worchel, Arnold, and Baker 1975). Similarly, research
on radio propaganda suggests that prior attitudes cause
heterogeneous reactions. Peisakhin and Rozenas (2018,
535) find that Russian propaganda generally helped pro-
Russian parties during the 2014 Ukrainian elections, but
it was “counter-effective in persuading those with strong
pro-Western priors.” Furthermore, Adena, Enikolopov,
Petrova, Santarosa, and Zhuravskaya (2015, 1885) con-
clude that in Germany, “Nazi radio was [...] effective in
places where anti-Semitism was historically high [but]
had a negative effect in places with historically low
anti-Semitism.” Whereas these studies rely on aggregate
outcome measures such as vote shares, we offer
individual-level evidence on potential differences be-
tween people with and without ideological linkages to
an autocratic regime.
When and How State Censorship
Backfires
Does media censorship cause political backlash? In this
section, we develop our theoretical argument, which is
summarized in Figure 1: We argue that people disap-
prove of blatant media censorship when they are able
to identify misinformation via an alternative source that
provides themwith credible informationon an important
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FIGURE 1 Argument
issue over a sustained period. People perceive censorship
as a restriction of their personal freedom, upon which
they develop an increased interest in the censored issue
and adopt a critical opinion toward the censor. Yet, we
do not expect censorship to affect recipients uniformly.
Individuals with an ideological disposition toward the
state should be less likely to acknowledge and disapprove
of state censorship. Next, we outline the psychological
foundations of our argument.
Why should individuals reject censorship in the first
place? Psychologists argue that withholding information
restricts an individual’s personal freedom, which induces
psychological costs (Brehm1966;BrehmandBrehm1981;
Wicklund 1974). People perceive censorship as an exter-
nal and illegitimate attempt to curtail their behavioral
choice. The greater these restrictions, the more severe the
grievances felt by an individual. In what psychologists
term reactance, people who suffer from being censored
seek to restore their original level of freedom and develop
an “enhanced interest in the object of the freedom lost”
(Hayes and Reineke 2007, 425). If the external limitation
persists, recipients adopt views that are contrary to the
one intended by the censor. Laboratory experiments con-
firm that participants exposed to censored information
develop a heightened interest in the censored issue and
change their attitudes in support of the object (Worchel,
Arnold, and Baker 1975).
These findings are also consistent with the propo-
sitions of dual process theories (e.g., De Neys 2018;
Kahneman 2011), according to which the human brain
generally operates in two states of mind—System I (au-
tonomous, fast, effortless) and System II (logic-based,
slow, memory intensive). While System I processes pro-
vide for most cognitive tasks, System II takes over only if
the individual is willing to spend his or her cognitive re-
sources to resolve conflicting impulses. The realization of
censorship may therefore motivate individuals to switch
toward a deliberate state of mind and critically engage
with reporting practices (Horz 2018). Insights from re-
actance and dual process theories therefore suggest that
blatant censorship constitutes an exogenous limitation
of personal freedom and induces individuals to question
the censor.
The precondition for such a reaction, however, is that
recipients have to realize that someone is withholding in-
formation from them. Unlike in laboratory settings, in
which researchers reveal censorship by design, authori-
tarian regimes typically deny the suppression of infor-
mation (Roberts 2018). People therefore require addi-
tional sources, which enable them to cross-check reports,
identify discrepancies, and infer the deliberate spread of
misinformation. These sources can be personal experi-
ences as well as alternative domestic or foreign media
(Huntington 1991; Sutton, Butcher, and Svensson 2014).
Having available such alternative sources of information
should enable people to recognize incompatibilities in re-
porting.
Nevertheless, incompatible reports alone arepresum-
ably insufficient to raise the suspicion of state censor-
ship. As alternative media might also exaggerate or even
fabricate stories, people are faced with an attribution
problem. In this situation, individuals’ ideological pre-
disposition likely influenceswhichnarrative they consider
moreplausible, andwhomtheyblame formisinformation
(Allcott and Gentzkow 2017). Research on the “hostile
media” phenomenon suggests that partisans tend to per-
ceive even objectively balanced reports as hostile and bi-
ased (e.g., Arceneaux, Johnson, and Murphy 2012; Baum
and Gussin 2008), whereas they want to believe in the
narrative of like-minded sources to keep their worldview
coherent (Little 2019). When confronted with conflicting
reports on alternativemedia, regime supporters are there-
fore likely to preclude the possibility of state censorship,
discounting alternative media as fake news. In contrast,
recipients without strong ideological regime ties should
be more receptive to alternative media content, which
makes them more likely to identify and disapprove of
censorship.3 We therefore expect the magnitude of back-
firing to be moderated by individuals’ ideological predis-
positions.
Irrespective of recipient-related differences, the risk
of political backlash should further rest on two scope
3Note that the group of people without a pro-regime disposition
should not be equated with regime opponents. As Geddes and
Zaller (1989) argue,most citizens in autocracies are at least partially
responsive to state media, even if they do not share the regime
ideology. Thus, the average backlash effect among people without
a pro-regime disposition should not be driven by a floor effect,
even if some regime opponents cannot “lose” any trust because
they have always assumed state media to lie.
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conditions. First, recipients need to consider the issue un-
equivocally newsworthy, as well as personally and socially
relevant. Second, the topic must be persistent. Censor-
ship becomes especiallymanifestwhen alternative sources
cover an important issue over a sustained period, whereas
state media neglect it. In this case, chances are minimal
that the discrepancies are due to different assessments
of a topic’s newsworthiness, and people are less likely to
believe that they had simply missed out on reports dis-
cussing the issue. The repeated perception of systematic
differences between reports on a focal issue should re-
inforce people’s conclusion that the state is withholding
information.4
In sum, we expect that censorship triggers disap-
proval when recipients may falsify information based on
conflicting, more trustworthy accounts in alternativeme-
dia. Individuals with ideological ties to the regime are less
likely to show disapproval upon biased reports even if
they can draw on alternative sources of information.
H1: Recipients who can draw on alternative sources
of information disapprove of media censorship
on a focal issue.
H2: While individuals with pro-regime disposition
are generally more approving of state news than
other recipients, theyupdate less negativelywhen
censorship is identifiable.5
Empirical Case
Sparse informationhas largely impeded research onback-
firing processes in reaction to censorship within autoc-
racies. We test our hypotheses with the case of East
Germany. In the summer of 1989, a sustained wave of
illegal emigration constituted a focal issue, which was
heavily censored by the regime. Yet, the majority of GDR
citizens could draw on West German television as an al-
ternative source of information. The case offers an excep-
tional opportunity to study individual-level reactions to
censorship within a highly authoritarian environment. It
4The scope condition that censored issuesmust be persistentmight
also explain why, for example, Chinese censors primarily focus
on statements with a collective action potential (King, Pan, and
Roberts 2013, 2014), which are often based on stories and events
that occur briefly. Nonetheless, repeated short-term censoring
might have a cumulative effect if people learn that the state sys-
tematically censors specific topics.
5As “all interactions are symmetric” (Berry, Golder, and Milton
2012, 653), specifying conditional relationships from both sides
(X|Z → Y and Z|X → Y ) increases the precision of theoretical
expectations and maximizes empirical falsifiability. For additional
information, see Appendix SI.7 in the supporting information (SI).
allows us to examine not only the influence of alternative
media and recipients’ ideological predispositions but also
people’s reaction to the cessation of censorship. Next, we
describe the conditions and developments that provided
the breeding ground for political backlash in response to
East German media censorship.
EmigrationWave
Throughout its existence, the German Democratic Re-
public was one of the most repressive Eastern Bloc states.
The ruthless surveillance apparatus together with the
poorly planned economy caused substantial political and
economic grievances, while the Iron Curtain largely pre-
vented people from moving to the West. Over 100,000
formal applications for emigration had been pending for
yearswhen theHungarian government facilitated the bor-
der crossing to Austria in May 1989. Although the easing
was limited to domestic merchants, the symbolic effect
on GDR citizens was enormous. Many decided not to
return from their summer holidays in the southern Bloc
states and to cross the Austro-Hungarian border instead
(Hirschman 1993).
Sincemost escape attempts had failed, the number of
East Germans waiting behind the border noticeably in-
creased in August (Timmer 2000). Others sought asylum
at the West German embassy in Budapest. In response
to growing pressure from the Western community, the
Hungarian government finally allowed foreigners to leave
for Austria (Richter 2009). As soon as East German offi-
cials ceased travel permits to Hungary, refugees went to
occupy the West German embassies at Prague and War-
saw, where they set up camps and held out for weeks to
enforce their emigration. The GDR leadership remained
uncompromising until the large-scale celebrations for the
fortieth regime anniversary came closer. To avoid any
disruption to the festivities, the East German govern-
ment agreed that the embassy occupants were allowed
to emigrate to West Germany—provided that the evac-
uation trains would pass through the territory of the
GDR (Richter 2009). The regime’s goal was to signal
sovereignty, but the result was mass commemorations
all along the train tracks (Bahr 1990; Hofmann 2014).
Censorship by East German State Media
Since the founding of the GDR, all media had been
subject to firm regime control and surveillance (Opp,
Voss, and Gern 1993; Timmer 2000). Editors of Aktuelle
Kamera, the national news program, had to submit all
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broadcasting sequences to the Secretariat for Agitation,
which would check them and adjust the program. To
ensure the implementation of socialist propaganda, the
regime hired media workers based on their ideological
conviction and allocated secret police agents to all major
editorial departments (Holzweißig 1989, 90).
With regard to the 1989 emigration crisis, the regime
imposed a strict censorship policy. This was a direct deci-
sion by ErichHonecker, the head of state, who sometimes
personally edited media content or demanded changes
during ongoing programs (Holzweißig 1989, 60–63;
Schabowski 1991, 235). At an August 1989 Politburo
meeting, Honecker ordered the national media to refrain
from covering the emigration crisis (Hesse 1990, 337).
Our systematic review of East German news transcripts
shows that East Germanmedia followed this instruction.6
If at all, the news referred to the crisis by accusing West
German media of a smear campaign against socialism.
When the regime granted the refugees their emigration to
the West, state news heavily disparaged them as “traitors,
over whom it was not worth to shed a single tear” (Ludes
1990, 217).7
West German Television as an Alternative
Source of Information
Given the regime’s tight grip on domestic media, people
informed themselves about the emigration crisis through
reports on West German television (WGTV). West Ger-
man public media and in particular the main evening
newscast (Tagesschau)had themission to informpeople in
both German states. Broadcasting statutes governed that
themedia should aim at the political reunification of Ger-
many (Hesse 1990, 334). About 90% of the East German
population received and regularly watched WGTV, and
many of them considered WGTV as trustworthy (Kern
and Hainmueller 2009; Meyen 2010, 29).
In contrast to GDR media, the West German Tagess-
chau extensively covered the 1989 emigration wave, pro-
viding updates about the number of refugees as well as
information on their motivation, needs, and desires.8
Many reports included interviews with emigrants and
video footage, while news anchors repeatedly referred to
6We collected all transcripts of the daily Aktuelle Kamera main
edition from the German Broadcasting Archive and coded all ref-
erences to the emigration crisis.
7Honecker himself added this sentence to the comment of the
General German News Service (Ludes 1990, 217).
8We systematically reviewed all recordings ofTagesschau during the
emigration crisis and compiled a daily news content data set. See
the data section for details.
FIGURE 2 East andWest German News
Coverage from July to December 1989
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Note: The plot shows the differences between Tagesschau
(West German news) and Aktuelle Kamera (East Ger-
man news) coverage of the emigration wave in days per
week. The dashed line marks the liberalization of GDR
statemedia. Positive y-values indicate thatTagesschau re-
ported on the emigration crisis more often than Aktuelle
Kamera, and vice versa.
the censoring practices by the East German state media.
Tagesschau started reporting on the emigration wave in
July 1989. Between the second week of August and the
end of September, it covered the emigration wave on a
daily basis.
Liberalization of State Media
From early on, parts of the East German ruling party
(SED) had been worried about adverse consequences of
the blatant censoring strategy, fearing that the population
would increasingly rely on Western media (Holzweißig
1997, 107). However, only after the resignation of Erich
Honecker on October 18, 1989, did the Politburo under
Egon Krenz order the national media to fundamentally
change reporting practices. The editors welcomed this
decision and quickly delivered much more objective cov-
erage (Hesse 1990, 339; Ludes 1990, 290). Figure 2 shows
the change in reporting. After the liberalization of state
media, East German news reported on emigration even
more extensively than their Western counterpart.
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Data andMethod
To assess whether media censorship induced political
backlash in 1989 East Germany, we compile an origi-
nal data set from various archival sources. To measure
people’s assessment of state media, we draw on the GDR’s
national media survey—a series of weekly representative
surveys on people’s consumption and evaluation of indi-
vidual TV programs (GESIS 2011). In face-to-face inter-
views, respondents were asked to rate individual broad-
casts thathadbeenaired in theprecedingdaysona5-point
scale. We use respondents’ approval ratings for the East
German newscast (Aktuelle Kamera) as our dependent
variable, ranging from 1 (lowest approval) to 5 (highest
approval). Drawing on all surveys conducted in 1989,9
the final data set includes 17,551 ratings of individualAk-
tuelle Kamera broadcasts from repeated cross-sections.10
The East Germannationalmedia survey is exception-
ally well suited to study the effects of censorship in an au-
thoritarian state. In the absence of free and fair elections,
the survey served the regime as an important indicator
of political attitudes and public opinion (Hausstein 2008,
68). Political leaders therefore were highly interested in
accurate, representative, and unbiased answers. The sur-
vey results were top secret and for regime-internal use
only. The National Committee for Television in charge of
the survey put great emphasis on a sophisticated scientific
sampling procedure and survey design. Due to the high
scientific standards and the practical efforts toward valid
and reliable results, the national media survey is consid-
ered the only East German social research institutionwith
the capacity, resources, and authority to produce reliable
and representative data on people’s attitudes (Braumann
1994, 527).
Each week, interviewers polled around 1,000 respon-
dents. To avoid social desirability bias, interviewers re-
ceived extensive training and had to guarantee to the
respondents full anonymity.11 A card index of all tele-
viewers from the Ministry for Postal and Telecommuni-
cation Services served as an up-to-date sampling frame,
which allowed for representative sampling, stratification,
and clustering. The sampling procedure was standardized
and did not change during the period under observation
(Hausstein 2008).12
9Data for calendar week 22 are unavailable.
10Repeated cross-sections allow us to study the variation in ratings
by different individuals across time and space, but not within-
person variation.
11Appendix SI.2.1 shows the original interviewer instructions.
12Appendix SI.2 describes the sampling process and measures to
maximize the validity of the surveys.
Research Design and Explanatory Variables
We test our hypotheses in two ways. In a first step, we
exclusively leverage the onset of the emigration issue
and the change in censoring practices to estimate the
effects of censorship on people’s evaluation of the East
German state news. Informed by historical accounts, we
divide the year into three successive periods. The Baseline
period runs from January until July 1989. The following
Censorship period from August to October 18 comprises
the highly censored first phase of the emigration crisis
until the resignation of Honecker, which marked the end
of blatant censorship. The last period, which we call Lib-
eralization period, covers the time of liberalized reporting
practices from October 19 to New Year’s Eve. In our
analyses, we include the two mutually exclusive dummy
variables Censorship period and Liberalization period,
with the Baseline period serving as the reference category.
Based on Hypothesis 1, we expect the coefficient for
Censorship period to be negative. Although the Baseline
period was not free from misinformation, our argument
suggests that only the sustained and identifiable discrep-
ancies between East and West German media coverage
on the emigration crisis caused mass disapproval of the
regime’s apparent censorship practices.
In the second,more refined step, we specifically scru-
tinize the impact of alternative sources of information,
which allow individuals to identify censorship. In order
to do so, we no longer impose the simplified distinction
between Baseline and Censorship period. Instead, we test
whether actual West German reports on the emigration
crisis were associated with disapproval of East German
state media. We compile an original data set, provid-
ing detailed information on the reported content in each
edition of the daily Tagesschau newscast from July to De-
cember 1989.13 The variableTagesschau indicates whether
West German news reported on the emigration crisis the
day before the Aktuelle Kamera edition to be rated by the
respondent.14 To gauge the effects of West German news
broadcasts before and after the liberalization of report-
ing practices, we include an interaction term between the
variablesTagesschau andLiberalization period. In linewith
Hypothesis 1, we expect the constituent term of Tagess-
chau to have a negative effect on respondents’ evaluation
of Aktuelle Kamera. This would suggest that people had
identified the censoring practices via contrasting reports
on refugees on WGTV.
13Tagesschau is the most important news program inWest German
television, with over eight million viewers (daily, 8:00–8:15p.m.).
14We lag the variable because the Aktuelle Kamera main edition
preceded that of the Tagesschau.
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To test for heterogeneous effects, as proposed in
Hypothesis 2, we include the variable SED. It indicates
whether a respondent reported being a member of the
socialist ruling party, serving as a proxy for the individ-
ual’s ideological linkage with the regime. The proportion
of self-reported SED members in our data remains fairly
stable at around 20–30%, approximating the estimated
SED membership rate among the general population at
that time (Jurich 2006).We interact the variable SEDwith
the period dummies to check whether SEDmembers dis-
approved of censorship less than nonmembers.
Control Variables
We control for variables that might confound our re-
sults. To account for general time trends, we include the
variable Average rating last week, which gives the average
rating of East German news in the previous week. We
further include the variable Week trains coded 1 for cal-
endar week 40, when the evacuation trains were passing
throughGDR territory. The binary variableDistrict trains
indicates whether a respondent (from calendar week 40
onwards) was living in the districts of Karl-Marx-Stadt or
Dresden, as the evacuation trains crossed these districts
and caused substantial attention.
We also control for sociodemographic respondent
characteristics based on a standardized set of questions
in the questionnaires of the national media survey. The
variable Rural indicates whether a respondent lived in
a rural area. To account for gender differences, we in-
clude the variableMale, whereasAge and its squared term
account for generational effects. Finally, the variable Edu-
cation gives people’s educational attainment on a 4-point
scale.15
Estimation Strategy
We treat the dependent variable as metric, assuming that
the rating is cardinal and categories are equidistant. We
therefore model the approval of Aktuelle Kamera using
linear regression models with standard errors clustered
over households to account for within-household corre-
lation. The unit of analysis is the broadcast-interviewee.
Results
Before turning to the statistical results, we present de-
scriptive evidence for the approval of East German news
15Table SI.1.1 provides coding details and summary statistics.
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in the course of 1989. Figure 3 shows the mean ap-
proval ratings for Aktuelle Kamera by SED members
and nonmembers. Descriptive results tentatively support
Hypothesis 1. When West German television started re-
porting on the emigration attempts of GDR citizens,
viewers identified the regime’s censorship strategy and
approval rates dropped.
Contrary toHypothesis 2, differences between the ap-
proval ratings by SEDmembers and nonmembers appear
marginal. Regime party members similarly disapproved
of the state media’s misinformation campaign. Figure 3
also shows a swift recovery of ratings following the liber-
alization of reporting practices, indicating that the reac-
tance effect of censorship was short-lived and reversible.
Basic Analyses
Next,wediscuss the evidence fromour statistical analyses.
Table 1 shows the results of the basic regression models.
Models 1–3 lend strong support for Hypothesis 1. The
negative and highly significant coefficient for Censorship
period confirms that approval ratings for the GDR state
news substantially decreased in view of the stark discrep-
ancies between the censored statemedia and the extensive
reports about the asylum seekers on WGTV. In line with
the descriptive evidence, Liberalization period has a posi-
tive and statistically significant effect on people’s approval
ratings, even exceeding the approval rates before the em-
igration crisis.
To test the moderating effect of a respondent’s pro-
regime disposition, as suggested by Hypothesis 2, we in-
teract SED with the period variables in Model 3. Results
show that SED members were generally more satisfied
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TABLE 1 Approval of GDR State News: Basic Analyses Using Time Periods
(1) (2) (3)
Censorship perioda −0.39∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Liberalization perioda 0.61∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
SED 0.09∗∗∗ 0.06∗
(0.02) (0.03)
SED × Censorship period −0.03
(0.07)
SED × Liberalization period 0.09∗
(0.04)
Average rating last week 0.36∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Rural 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Week trains −0.34∗∗∗ −0.35∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07)
District trains −0.12∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Male −0.02 −0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
Age 0.10 0.11
(0.09) (0.09)
Age2 −0.004 −0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Education −0.12∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Intercept 3.53∗∗∗ 1.85∗ 1.82∗
(0.02) (0.79) (0.79)
N 17,551 17,235 17,235
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.26 0.27
Note: The table reports coefficients with standard errors clustered on households.
∗p< .05, ∗∗p< .01, ∗∗∗p< .001
aReference category: Baseline period.
with GDR state news. However, the coefficient for the in-
teraction between Censorship period and SED is indistin-
guishable from zero. SED members seem to have shown
the same level of discontent for the censored news pro-
gram as nonmembers.
Figure 4 depicts the substantive effects of censor-
ship and liberalization for both SED members and non-
members. Whereas the positive effect of liberalization is
significantly stronger for SED members, we find no sta-
tistically significant difference between the reactions to
censorship (p = .598). Personal regime linkages did not
tame disapproval of censorship but facilitated recovery
upon reformation. SED members may have disapproved
of the regime’s misinformation strategy, as they antici-
pated that people with access toWGTV could easily iden-
tify the state’s crude attempt to hush up problems, further
diminishing the regime’s legitimacy. This might also ex-
plain why party members welcomed the liberalization of
state media even more than other viewers. Regime affil-
iates, whose private privileges depended on the party’s
rule, likely considered the change in reporting as a nec-
essary step to win back trust and to save the regime from
collapse.16
16Moreover, emerging disillusionment with the regime’s perfor-
mance during the late 1980s may have weakened pro-regime
dispositions and contributed to the party cadres’ disapproval of
censorship.
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FIGURE 4 Effects of Censorship and Liberalization on the Approval of GDR State News
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–.3
–.2
–.1
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
Ch
an
ge
 in
 a
pp
ro
va
l o
f A
kt
ue
lle
 K
am
er
a 
Among
SED
members
Among
non-
members
Effect of Censorship period
p = .032*
–.4
–.3
–.2
–.1
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
Among
SED
members
Among
non-
members
Effect of Liberalization period
Note: The plot shows estimated effects of censorship and liberalization periods on the evaluations of Aktuelle Kamera
by SED members and nonmembers. Black and white dots represent first-difference estimates for SED members and
nonmembers, respectively; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Calculations are based on Model 3.
Regarding the control variables, people seem to have
been less satisfied with East German newswhen they were
better educated, lived in urban areas, or lived in districts
through which the evacuation trains passed. Approval
ratings additionally decreased in the week in which the
evacuation trains crossed GDR territory. All models show
a substantial fit to the data explaining up to 27% of the
variance in the dependent variable.
Refined Analyses
Table 2 shows the refined analyses of the relationship be-
tween domestic censorship, alternative information, and
news approval. Here, we no longer impose the starting
date of the censorship period. Instead, Models 4 and 5
include the variable Tagesschau, which indicates whether
West German news reported on the emigration crisis on
the day before. We interact the variable Tagesschau with
Liberalization period, such that the coefficient for Tagess-
chau gives the effect of West German news reports before
the liberalization.
Again, results strongly support Hypothesis 1. The co-
efficient for Tagesschau is negative and highly statistically
significant. This suggests that Western reports about the
emigration wave helped to showcase the regime’s censor-
ing activities, inducing viewers to disapprove of the sub-
sequent edition of East German news. Figure 5 shows the
substantive effect of Tagesschau reports on the approval
of Aktuelle Kamera. Before the liberalization, viewers sig-
nificantly decreased their approval of Aktuelle Kamera
when Tagesschau reported on the emigration wave. After
the regime had abolished censoring, West German news
coverage no longer affected the ratings.
Model 5 includes a three-way interaction between
SED, Tagesschau, and Liberalization period to test for
SOMETIMES LESS IS MORE 11
TABLE 2 Effect of Tagesschau Reports on the
Approval of GDR State News
(4) (5)
Tagesschau −0.20∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)
Liberalization period 0.43∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)
Tagesschau
× Liberalization period
0.19∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
SED 0.09∗∗∗ 0.06
(0.02) (0.03)
SED × Tagesschau −0.01
(0.06)
SED × Liberalization
period
0.07
(0.05)
SED × Tagesschau ×
Liberalization period
0.08
(0.08)
Controls
√ √
N 17,235 17,235
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.27
Note: The table reports coefficients with standard errors clustered
on households.
∗p< .05, ∗∗p< .01, ∗∗∗p< .001
heterogeneous effects. Again, the coefficient of the inter-
action term between Tagesschau and SED, which gives the
effect of West German news reports among party mem-
bers compared to nonmembers before the liberalization,
is statistically insignificant.17 Respondents with links to
the regime reacted to emigration reports on WGTV in
the same way as individuals without SED membership.
Both groups equally downgraded the subsequent edition
of Aktuelle Kamera. SED members and nonmembers did
not significantly differ in their reaction to Tagesschau
reports before or after the liberalization of GDRmedia.18
Consistent with the results of our basic analyses, we do
not find a moderating effect of regime linkages.
Robustness Checks
Our findings remain stable for a wide range of robustness
checks. First, we rerun our main Models 3 and 4
using ordered probit regression models (Table SI.5.1).
Second, we include either random intercepts or fixed
effects on the district level, and random intercepts on
the household and respondent levels to control for
17Figure SI.4.1 visualizes the substantive effect.
18As can be seen from Table SI.5.3 the results are robust when we
substitute the dummy variable Tagesschau with a continuous mea-
sure of the duration Tagesschau reported on emigration each day.
unobserved heterogeneity (see Table SI.5.2). Third, we
control for the weekday of the GDR news broadcast
to account for potential biases from systematically
different approval ratings on specific days of the week
(Table SI.5.4). Fourth, we exclude and use alternative
measures for the control variable Average rating last week
to rule out that our results are sensitive to the modeling
of potential time trends (Table SI.5.5). Finally, we rerun
our analyses without observations from November
and December, as the proportion of self-reported SED
membership slightly decreased during these months
(Figure SI.3.1 and Table SI.5.6).
Observable Implications and
Alternative Explanations
Next, we empirically test observable implications and dis-
cuss potential alternative explanations for our findings.
First, we test the observable implication of our claim
that Tagesschau served as an alternative source of in-
formation and presented the decisive tool to falsify do-
mestic media content by drawing on spatial variation
in access to West German television. Second, we assess
FIGURE 5 Effect of Tagesschau Reports on
Approval Rates for GDR State News
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Note: The plot shows estimated effects of Tagesschau re-
ports about emigration on evaluations of Aktuelle Kam-
era. Black dots represent first-difference estimates; verti-
cal lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Calculations
are based on Model 4.
12 CHRISTIAN GLA¨ßEL AND KATRIN PAULA
whether our results are merely picking up general time
trends in people’s sentiments that are independent of the
regime’s censoring practices. Third, we check whether
the series of anti-regime demonstrations and the non-
coverage by GDR state news drive our results. All tests
provide corroborative evidence for our findings. Alterna-
tive explanations are unlikely to account for our results,
whereas observable implications support our suggested
mechanism.
Spatial Variation in Access toWest German
Television
First, we exploit the spatial variation in the access toWest
German television. Due to limited signal strength and to-
pography, people in some parts of the GDR had little or
no access to WGTV.19 Our theory predicts that Tagess-
chau reports should not be correlated with approval rat-
ings of Aktuelle Kamera in areas without WGTV access
since respondents were not able to identify censorship
via alternative sources. The variable No WGTV indicates
whether the respondent lived in a district with limited
or no WGTV access. Consistent with prior research on
1989 East Germany, we employ a dichotomous measure
of WGTV access based on signal strength (e.g., Crab-
tree, Darmofal, and Kern 2015; Kern 2011; Kern and
Hainmueller 2009) and code the variable No WGTV
to 1 if a respondent lived in the districts of Dresden,
Neubrandenburg, or Rostock, and 0 otherwise (Bursztyn,
and Cantoni 2016, 30).20 To test for different reactions in
regions with and without WGTV, we perform our main
analysis for the time before the liberalization, now includ-
ing an interaction term between the variables Tagesschau
and No WGTV.
In line with our suggested mechanism, we find that
evaluations by respondents without WGTV were indeed
unaffected byTagesschau reports. In contrast, people with
WGTV access significantly disapproved of the censored
state newswhen theWestGermanTagesschauhad covered
19This exogenous variation has been used to study protest
(Crabtree,Darmofal, andKern 2015;Kern 2011), regime legitimacy
(Kern and Hainmueller 2009), and consumer behavior (Bursztyn,
and Cantoni 2016).
20Applying the coding rule byCrabtree,Darmofal, andKern (2015),
this classification corresponds to any minimum signal strength
threshold between –84.7 and –77.8 dBm. Appendix SI.6 offers ad-
ditional information on operationalization (including an explana-
tion for the use of a binarymeasure), identification, and robustness
checks. Table SI.6.1 provides the regression results using more ex-
treme cut-off values and alternative coding decisions. Figure SI.6.3
shows that the substantive interpretation of our results remains
unchanged. We thank Leonardo Bursztyn and Davide Cantoni for
kindly sharing their data.
FIGURE 6 Effect of Tagesschau Reports among
People with and withoutWGTV
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Note: The plot shows estimated first-difference effects of
Tagesschau reports about emigration on approval ratings
for Aktuelle Kamera. Dots represent first-difference esti-
mates; vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.
The p-value shows that the difference in effects is statis-
tically significant. Calculations are based on Model 1 in
Table SI.6.1.
the emigration crisis before. Figure 6 visualizes the corre-
sponding first-difference effects from Tagesschau reports
among respondents from areas with and without WGTV
access. The result strongly corroborates our suggested
mechanism in that domestic censorship triggers backlash
if people can draw on alternative sources of information.
Placebo Test
Next, we scrutinize alternative explanations for our find-
ings. Changes in the approval of Aktuelle Kamera might
simply reflect a general time trend in the rating of the na-
tional broadcast program. People might use the survey to
voice their general current dissatisfactionwith the regime.
To check whether this is the case, we run a placebo anal-
ysis regressing recipients’ approval of the GDR Tele-Lotto
broadcasts (live drawing of the lottery numbers) on the
same set of explanatory variables.21 Analogous to the rat-
ings of East German news, people rated Tele-Lotto on the
21Figure SI.3.2 shows evaluations of Tele-Lotto over time.
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TABLE 3 Placebo Test: Approval of Tele-Lotto
(6) (7)
Censorship period 0.06
(0.03)
Liberalization period −0.07 −0.12∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
SED −0.03 −0.06
(0.04) (0.03)
SED × Censorship period −0.06
(0.06)
SED × Liberalization period −0.04
(0.08)
Tagesschau 0.04
(0.03)
Tagesschau × Liberalization period 0.06
(0.06)
Controls
√ √
N 5,580 5,580
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.03
Note: The table reports coefficients with standard errors clustered
on households.
∗p< 0.05, ∗∗p< 0.01, ∗∗∗p< 0.001
same 5-point scale each week.22 If people’s disapproval of
Aktuelle Kamera was unrelated to news censorship and if
our estimates picked up a general trend in public senti-
ment, the time periods should have similar effects on the
ratings of Tele-Lotto.
Table 3 shows that this is not the case.Neither thevari-
able Censorship period (Model 6) nor the variable Tagess-
chau (Model 7) is significantly correlatedwith evaluations
of Tele-Lotto. The negative coefficient for Liberalization
period in Model 7 suggests that respondents’ approval
of Tele-Lotto even decreased after the liberalization of re-
porting practices, which clearly contradicts a general time
trendbehindourmain findings. Furthermore, themodels
only account for 3% of the variance in the Tele-Lotto rat-
ings as compared to27%inAktuelleKamera ratings.23 The
placebo test corroborates our main findings. The chang-
ing approval rates for East German news are unlikely to
reflect a time trend in people’s general sentiments.
22The lottery show was also aired in the early evening (Sundays,
7pm).
23Table SI.6.2 and Figure SI.6.4 show that our analyses precisely
capture the development of East German news ratings, irrespective
of general time trends.
Demonstrations in the Fall of 1989
Finally, our models might not reflect the effects of state
media’s censorship of refugees, but that of the subsequent
anti-regime protests. From a theoretical perspective, the
demonstrations between September and December 1989
were also important and persistent events censored by
state media for a substantial period of time, whereas
WGTV provided some coverage. The censorship of na-
tionwide protests might have unfolded a similar backlash
effect on people’s assessment of the East German news.
To test whether this is the case, we code all Tagesschau
reports on anti-regime demonstrations and add the vari-
ableTagesschau demonstrations as a control. Table 4 shows
our analyses of the full year (Model 8) and the time before
the liberalization only (Model 9). The results demonstrate
that the substantive interpretation of ourmain finding re-
mains unchangedwhenwe control for reports on demon-
strations.24 While the variable Tagesschau demonstrations
also has a negative effect, WGTV reports on the emigra-
tion crisis still significantly reduce the approval ofAktuelle
Kamera.
The results suggest that Tagesschau reports on
emigration were the main driver for the decreasing
approval of East German news. Both the emigration
crisis and the decrease in approval ofAktuelle Kamera had
started already one month before the first protest events.
TABLE 4 Approval of GDR State News
Controlling for Reports on
Demonstrations
(8) (9)
Liberalization period 0.44∗∗∗
(0.04)
Tagesschau −0.20∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)
Tagesschau × Liberalization period 0.19∗∗∗
(0.04)
SED 0.09∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03)
Tagesschau demonstrations −0.01 −0.11∗
(0.02) (0.06)
Controls
√ √
N 17,235 8,464
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.13
Note: The table reports coefficients with standard errors clustered
on households.
∗p< .05, ∗∗p< .01, ∗∗∗p< .001
24Table SI.6.3 shows that even the effect sizes of the variable Tagess-
chau are stable.
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September 4, the Tagesschau reported on demonstrations
in the GDR for the first time. Another reason why
reports on emigration exhibit more explanatory power
than those on protest is that West German journal-
ists were better able to provide detailed footage and
firsthand testimonies of the emigration crisis because
these developments took place outside GDR territory.
Conversely, East German security forces closely observed
foreign journalists and largely preventedWestern camera
teams from filming protests in the early days of the
uprising. Based on the results of our content analysis of
Tagesschau, the emigration wave received substantially
more attention during the censorship period than the
demonstrations in East German cities.
Conclusion
This article studies whether and under which conditions
censorship backfires against authoritarian regimes. We
find that alternative sources of information enable peo-
ple to identify misinformation on censored state media.
Our statistical analysis of East German media surveys
throughout the revolutionary year of 1989 clearly shows
that the socialist regime paid a high price for censoring
the country’s emigration crisis. In view of the regime’s
blatant censorship strategy, the population increasingly
disapproved of the national news program. Consistent
with our theoretical argument, we empirically show that
the disapproval of the regime’s main newscast was closely
associated with foreign reports on the emigration crisis.
WestGermannews exposed censorship on state television
as part of the regime’s larger misinformation campaign.
Our results present the first empirical evidence that ex-
cessive information manipulation may work against the
regime’s interests by diminishing the reliability of state
media (Little 2017; Shadmehr and Bernhardt 2015).
In contrast to laboratory research, we do not find
heterogeneous effects. Pro-regime dispositions did not
moderate people’s rejection of censorship. Members of
the ruling party opposed statemedia’s censoring activities
as much as nonmembers. Future research might examine
under which conditions regime supporters endorse or
reject censorship. In addition, our analysis questions the
persistenceof backfiring effects.We find that respondents’
approval ratings for state media recovered soon after the
regime had ceased its censoring practice and adopted a
more objective style of reporting.
Our article has four important implications. First,
more censorship does not imply more stability. Whereas
research on social movements and state repression com-
monly conceives of censorship as an effective government
tool to contain resistance, we show that media censorship
entails a backlash potential on its own. Blatant censor-
ing of state media reveals the regime’s deceptive inten-
tions and its vulnerability to a large audience. Instead of
terminating public resistance, censorship may thus help
social movements to gain momentum and mobilize a
critical mass. Concerning the German Democratic Re-
public, Hirschman (1993) and Richter (2009) claim that
the emigration wave represented the country’s first oppo-
sition movement that successfully changed the power re-
lationship between the regime and its citizens, setting the
stage for the Peaceful Revolution. Future research might
study when outrage over misinformation translates into
resistance in the streets and when censorship successfully
prevents organized opposition.
Second, alternative sources of information may pro-
voke distrust in traditional media and political elites.
Our findings demonstrate that foreign efforts to provide
people with alternative information can influence public
opinion, putting pressure on a censoring regime. In some
respects, East and West Germany may be interpreted as
a most likely case to observe such effects: People in both
states shared a historical and cultural background, spoke
the same language, and showed great mutual interest. On
other dimensions, however, the German Democratic Re-
public appears as a hard case. The socialist regime had
been extensively indoctrinating its citizens for decades
to render them immune against foreign subversion and
exerting strong social pressures for conformist behavior.
This suggests that external information campaigns can
foster liberalization processes even in highly ideological
regimes. Recent such efforts include the “Flash Drives
for Freedom” campaign and the BBC’s Korean-language
radio service for North Korea (Ryall 2017). The harsh
reaction by the North Korean government against these
initiatives suggests that also the regime perceives the in-
flux of external information as distinctly threatening.
Third, past failures of all-encompassing media cen-
sorship might explain why current authoritarian regimes
appear to use it in a more restrained and nuanced way.
Authoritarian regimes may have learned from historic
failures. Especially the breakdown of the German Demo-
cratic Republic might serve as a cautionary tale, as the
East German regime’s inability to seal off society from
alternative media resembles the challenges faced by mod-
ern dictatorships in times of the Internet. In order not
to suffer the same fate, current autocracies might have
adjusted their repressive tool kit accordingly and refined
their misinformation strategies.
Finally, our findings suggest that campaigns aimed at
undermining trust in traditional journalism may even
cause political backlash against righteous media and
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regimes that grant full freedom of expression—including
democracies. If such campaigns manage to build confi-
dence, they can spreaddoubts about the integrity of estab-
lished news sources and fuel people’s perception of being
systematically misinformed. Quality journalism appears
to be particularly vulnerable to accusations of censorship
since it is based on the obligation to check facts carefully
and refrain from reporting when a story’s authenticity
remains in doubt. Given the backlash potential from per-
ceived censorship, states should therefore have an interest
in actively protecting quality journalism from such illu-
sive campaigns.
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